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The discrete-variable QKD protocols based on BB84 are known to be secure against an eavesdropper,
Eve, intercepting the flying qubits and performing any quantum operation on them. However, these
protocols may still be vulnerable to side-channel attacks. We investigate the Trojan-Horse side-
channel attack where Eve sends her own state into Alice’s apparatus and measures the reflected
state to estimate the key. We prove that the separable coherent state is optimal for Eve amongst
the class of multi-mode Gaussian attack states. We describe how Alice may defend against this by
adding thermal noise to the system and give an analytic expression of the resulting secret key rate.
We also provide a bound on the secret key rate in the case where Eve may use any separable state,
and describe an active defense system based on optical modulators.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems are generally
created with the promise that the uncertainty inherent
in quantum measurements allows for two or more parties
to communicate with unconditional security. By this, it
is meant that an eavesdropper, Eve, may be imbued with
unbounded computational power and be able to do any-
thing that is allowed by the laws of physics, yet still only
achieve a level of mutual information with a bit string
shared by valid parties Alice and Bob that is exponen-
tially small with the key length [1]. This is in contrast
with classical encryption, for which the above claim only
holds when Eve has some bounded computational ability
(which may be exceeded by a quantum computer [2]).
In any claim of security assumptions will necessarily
be made on restrictions on the methods by which Eve
may try to learn the key. For example, it is clear that if
Eve has unrestricted access to Alice’s lab then no level
of sophistication in the protocol can prevent her from
learning the key. Therefore we must always decide on a
boundary demarcating the quantum or classical objects
that Eve may access from the ones that she may not.
In the standard proofs of the security of many QKD
protocols, it is assumed that Eve may interact with any of
the “flying” photonic qubits that are sent between Alice
and Bob and with the quantum channel carrying them.
Her operations may include storing the qubits for arbi-
trarily long periods of time, performing multipartite ro-
tations or measurements, entangling these with ancilla
states, or replacing sections of the channel with loss-free
channels. Renner used the de Finetti theorem to show
that this very general case is equivalent to the case of
Eve performing operations on one qubit at a time [3],
and along with [4] and [5], this proves the security of
BB84 [6] against such attacks.
However, we must assume that Eve is wily and cun-
ning, and will seek alternative hidden avenues known as
∗ svinay1@sheffield.ac.uk
side-channel attacks (SCAs) [7–16]. One such SCA that
has recently received theoretical [17–19] and experimen-
tal [20–22] attention is the so-called Trojan Horse Attack
(THA). Here, Eve will tap into the optical channel that
Alice and Bob use to communicate. She will then send
her own optical state into Alice’s system, whereupon it
will reflect off the same apparatus used to encode the
legitimate photonic qubits. Having picked up some in-
formation on the encoding of the latest quantum state
that Alice sent, it will return out and be measured by
Eve. Eve will then use the result of this measurement,
possibly combined with some operation on the legitimate
qubits, to make a best estimate of the state that Alice
sent to Bob, thus giving her some non-negligible infor-
mation mutual with the key.
This attack has previously been analysed by Luca-
marini et al. [19] They assume that Eve uses a coherent
state to probe the system, and describe using a one-way
attenuating filter at the entry-point of Alice’s apparatus
as a defense. The effect of this is to absorb the major-
ity of light that is sent into the system, such that Eve
receives far less than one photon back per attempt, re-
ducing her ability to estimate the key bit. They make use
of the theoretical framework of Gottesman et al. [23] to
get an expression for the rate at which Alice and Bob can
generate a secret key in the presence of such an attack.
In this paper we make use of this same framework, but
extend the range of powers of both Eve and Alice. The
paper is organised as follows. In section II we describe
some of the fundamental notions necessary to understand
the process of encoding in a phase-modulated BB84 pro-
tocol. In section III, we describe and analyse the effect
of Eve performing a THA on the system, allowing her to
use any Gaussian state including multimode entangled
states. We prove that the (separable) coherent states are
optimal amongst this class. As part of this analysis, we
describe a defense system that Alice may employ that
involves deliberately adding thermal noise to the system.
We show that this can more than double the range over
which a QKD system can securely communicate.
Motivated by the revelation that entanglement does
not assist Eve when using Gaussian states to attack the
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2FIG. 1: A phase-shift between an early and a late
mode, parameterised by θ, encodes the quantum bit.
system, in section IV we restrict Eve to separable states.
We derive a bound on the information that Eve may learn
about the key when we allow her to use any separable
state. Finally, in section V we describe an active defense
system that may be used in place of attenuating filter.
This relies on the causing Eve’s THA light pulse to un-
dergo many reflections before being returned.
II. PRELIMINARY NOTIONS
We consider here an implementation of the BB84 [6]
protocol. Here, Alice chooses one of two mutually unbi-
ased bases, X and Y . After choosing a basis she then
sends a photon encoding either state |0X,Y 〉 or |1X,Y 〉.
These states are encoded as
|0, 1X,Y 〉 = |L〉+ e
iθ |E〉
2
, (1)
where |E〉 and |L〉 are early and late modes as shown in
Fig. 1.
The key parameter here is θ, which encodes the state
as follows:
|0X〉 → θ = 0 |0Y 〉 → θ = pi/2
|1X〉 → θ = pi |1Y 〉 → θ = 3pi/2 (2)
It is this parameter that Eve wishes to estimate. In
order to do this, she prepares her own state, ρ. This is
assumed to exist in the photonic Fock space of a single
mode. The single mode assumption is justified since we
may say that Alice will filter out all frequencies that are
not equal to the one sent to Bob. It may also be assumed
without loss of power or generality to be pure. This state
is sent into Alice’s system. Here it passes through a filter
which allows a fraction η  1 of the light to be transmit-
ted, resulting in a state ρη. It then reaches the polarizing
filter, where it evolves according to the same Hamiltonian
that encoded θ into the photon that was sent to Bob.
That is to say, it is transformed as follows:
ρη → ρθη ≡ eiθaˆ
†aˆρη e
−iθaˆ†aˆ, (3)
where aˆ is the annihilation operator on the Fock space of
Eve’s photons. After Eve’s state has picked up the phase
information it returns to her. She then performs some
operation to try to make an estimate of θ.
III. GAUSSIAN STATE ATTACK AND
THERMAL DEFENSE
Attenuation-based defense systems, which aim to
muddy the phase information on Eve’s state by block-
ing most of the incoming attack state, have been pre-
viously analysed by Lucamarini et al. [19] They show
that in order to realise any appreciable level of security,
a very high level of attenuation is required. Specifically
it requires that Eve get back far less than one photon per
attempt. We want to investigate whether it is possible to
relax this requirement by implementing complementary
security measures.
To this end, we will consider a system where Alice adds
a small amount of thermal noise with average photon
number µT into the signal she sends out to Bob. Since
Eve taps into this same channel, some of this noise will
also be picked up by Eve. It will be combined with her
returned state ρθη to produce the state ρ
θ
η,µT .
When running a protocol such as BB84, Alice and Bob
can only try to generate secret key bits from the attempts
where Bob successfully received a signal. So after post-
selecting on these bits Bob must receive at least one pho-
ton per bit generation attempt. On the other hand, we
may choose the strength of the attenuator such that Eve
receives much less than one photon per attempt. There-
fore, if µT is less than one, but comparable to the average
photon number of ρη, then the addition of this thermal
noise is likely to affect Eve more than it affects Bob.
Subsections III B and III C aim to quantify this.
A. State description
Here we will describe specifically how we construct
ρθη,µT from ρ, and how Eve should choose ρ to maximise
her knowledge of the key.
Firstly, it is clear that the choice of initial state ρ will
have a significant effect on Eve’s ability to discern θ.
There are certain properties of this state that we can
identify that we expect to affect this in varying degrees.
The property that may be most apparent is that of the
average photon number of the state. If Eve sends in a
single photon, then given a high amount of attenuation,
she is not likely to get much back and will not be able
to reliably learn θ. On the other hand if she is allowed
to send in an arbitrarily bright state with unbounded av-
erage photon number it is clear that she will always be
able to distinguish the different settings of θ perfectly.
Therefore, to be able to implement any QKD protocol,
the first step in protecting against a THA is putting some
upper bound on the average number of photons that may
pass into the system. This may be done by way of some
defense such as an optical fuse [24], which melts when suf-
ficiently many photons pass through it, or by identifying
some other component which will be irreversibly dam-
aged when subject to a bright enough light [25]. A more
detailed examination of the numbers and figures behind
3such defenses may be found in [19], but for our purposes
we may simply assume that there does exist some bound
N such that 〈nˆ〉ρ ≡ Tr [nˆρ] < N , where nˆ = aˆ†aˆ.
Another relevant property may be the purity of the
state ρη after passing through the attenuator. Most
states will become mixed after undergoing loss, however
coherent states (as used in [19]) will not. They are in-
stead mapped to coherent states with lower photon num-
bers. As a result of this, the loss does not introduce any
classical uncertainty into the estimation of the phase. It
may also be the case that entanglement assists the esti-
mation, as is the case with entanglement-assisted illumi-
nation [26]. It is important that we search for the most
powerful possible attack that Eve may make, taking all
of these factors into consideration. It is only then that
we may have confidence in our security proofs against the
THA or other SCAs.
We will consider the case where Eve may use any multi-
mode entangled Gaussian state. Since only one mode en-
ters Alice’s apparatus, Eve needs only to use at most one
idler mode, which she retains as a reference [27]. This
state is created by applying a two-mode squeezer to the
vacuum followed by a displacement on the mode that en-
ters Alice’s system (applying a displacement to the idler
mode turns out to have no effect on the the amount of
information that Eve may learn about the key). Up to
a change of variables in the squeezing and displacement
parameters, this setup is equivalent to all other combina-
tions of Gaussian operations [28], such as applying single-
mode squeezers and displacing before squeezing. This,
therefore, represents the most general Gaussian-state at-
tack that Eve may make.
Eve’s initial state is then
ρ = Dˆ(α) Sˆ2(ξE) |0〉〈0| Sˆ†2(ξE) Dˆ†(α), (4)
where Dˆ(α) = exp
(
αaˆ† − α∗aˆ) is the displacement op-
erator, Sˆ2(ξE) = exp
(
1
2ξE aˆ
†bˆ† − ξ∗E aˆbˆ
)
is the two-mode
squeeze operator (where bˆ acts on Eve’s idler mode) and
|0〉 is the vacuum state. Without loss of generality we
will let ξE be real.
As is typical, we will model the loss due to the atten-
uator as a beam splitter. A fraction η is allowed to pass
through to reach Alice’s apparatus, and 1− η is diverted
into an auxiliary environment mode.
The final ingredient to be included is the thermal noise.
This may be produced by heating up a portion of the op-
tical fibre, so that Eve receives both her own photons that
she sent in, as well as the thermal noise photons added
by Alice. Here we need some careful thought as to how
exactly we will mathematically combine these two states.
In other papers [29], thermal noise has been added to a
signal by passing both the signal and the noise through
a beam splitter. However, this does not seem to us to
be appropriate in this situation for the following reason.
Suppose the combined state is produced by passing these
two states through a beam splitter with transmissivity
ηT , so that ηT = 1 means that the resulting state is en-
tirely a thermal state, and ηT = 0 means it is all signal.
However, this introduces a new variable into the situa-
tion, which implies some degree of coupling between the
thermal source and Eve’s returned state. We want Eve to
be oblivious as to the actual source of the thermal noise,
and simply consider it as a simultaneously arriving light
source. In particular, if we let ηT = 1 and µT = 0, we
arrive at the rather paradoxical conclusion that the sig-
nal has been completely overwhelmed by a thermal state
containing no photons. For a similar reason we cannot
combine ρθη with a thermal density matrix ρTh by way of
a classical mixture such as pρθη + (1 − p)ρTh. As such,
we expect that the strength of the thermal noise should
depend only on the single parameter µT .
A method for the proper treatment of constructing
a combined state from multiple simultaneously arriving
photonic states was described by Glauber in his origi-
nal treatment of the coherent states [30]. However, that
method involved expressing the states in a diagonal co-
herent basis (the so-called P -representation). Whilst this
is a powerful method, it results in an expression for the
state that is no longer easily analytically tractable (al-
though it is possible to use this to numerically analyse
the effects of adding non-thermal noise). Since we are
dealing here with Gaussian states we shall take advan-
tage of a nice property of thermal states: that they may
be produced be taking the partial trace over one mode of
a two-mode squeezed vacuum with squeezing parameter
ξT = arcsinh(
√
µT ). Therefore, we shall model the addi-
tion of the thermal noise as the action of Alice passing
Eve’s returning signal through a two-mode squeezer with
the vacuum, and discarding one of the resulting modes.
Note that she does not physically do this, it is only used
to find the mathematical form of the state. Within this
framework, Eve should choose α and ξE to maximise her
mutual information with the secret key. The full set-up
for the construction of Eve’s state is illustrated in Fig. 2.
A great advantage of working with Gaussian states is
that they may be completely characterised by their first
and second moments. For an n-mode Gaussian state let
uˆ be the vector of operators [xˆ1, pˆ1, . . . , xˆn, pˆn]
T
. Then
to each Gaussian state, ρ, we may uniquely assign a pair
(u, V ) which we call the mean vector and covariance ma-
trix respectively, with elements defined by
ui = Tr [ρuˆi],
Vi,j =
Tr [ρuˆiuˆj ] + Tr [ρuˆj uˆi]
2
− Tr [ρuˆi] Tr [ρuˆj ] .
(5)
Let φ be the relative angle between the displacement
and the squeezing parameters in the complex plane, µD =
η |α|2 be the average displacement after loss, and ω =
cosh(2ξE) be the normalised quadrature variance for a
squeezed vacuum state. It then follows from Eq. 5 and
Eq. 4 that the mean vector and covariance matrix for
Eve’s returned states corresponding to θ = 0 and θ = pi2
are as follows:
4FIG. 2: Top: Schematic diagram illustrating the
physical mechanisms that produce Bob and Eve’s
states. The dotted line outlines the “legitimate” part of
the protocol, comprising the signal and the thermal
noise (dashed line). Bottom: Circuit diagram showing
the mathematical mechanisms that produce Eve’s final
state. Shown from left to right are the effects of Eve’s
squeezing, Eve’s state displacement, Alice’s attenuator,
picking up the phase information, and adding the
thermal noise. Double horizontal lines represent taking
a partial trace over the relevant mode.
uθ=0 =
(sinφ+ cosφ)
√
2µD
(sinφ− cosφ)√2µD
0
0
 ,
Vθ=0 =
1
2
[
[(1 + µT )ωη + µT ]12 A σZ
A σZ ω1
]
,
uθ=pi2 =
(cosφ− sinφ)
√
2µD
(cosφ+ sinφ)
√
2µD
0
0
 ,
Vθ=pi2 =
1
2
[
[(1 + µT )ωη + µT ]12 A σX
A σX ω1
]
,
(6)
where A =
√
(1 + µT ) (ω2 − 1) η and σZ and σX are the
Pauli Z and X matrices respectively.
B. Secret key rate
In all QKD systems the main quantity of merit is the
secret key rate, K. This is the rate at which Alice and
Bob can generate key bits with exponentially high se-
curity, which is in general lower than the rate at which
Alice and Bob exchange raw key bits. This quantity is
dependent on the specific choice of protocol that is be-
ing implemented. Here, we will analyse the performance
of the BB84 protocol, which may be seen to be equiva-
lent to entanglement-based protocols such as E91. This
is because instead of deciding on a key bit |0B〉 or |1B〉
to send out for some basis B, Alice may instead pre-
pare the entangled state (|0B〉 |↑〉+ |1B〉 |↓〉) /
√
2, send
the first mode to Bob and keep the second mode. She
would then make a measurement of her retained mode to
“decide” on the key bit. A similar process can be done
to decide the basis. Since both frameworks are the same
from the point of view of local density matrices as seen
by Eve, the security of one reduces to the security of the
other.
In vanilla BB84 with no threat of THA, the secret key
rate has been found to be [23]
K = R [1− 2H2()] , (7)
where R is the raw key rate,  is the bit-error rate and
H2() = − log2() − (1 − ) log2(1 − ) is the binary
entropy function. We may say that one of these terms
of H2() is due to Alice and Bob sacrificing key bits to
perform error correction, and one factor is due to them
applying classical privacy amplification algorithms.
Due to the nature of the THA being a SCA, Eve’s at-
tack will not affect the bit-error rate measured by Alice
and Bob. However, it will still clearly compromise the
security, so Eq. 7 cannot represent the achievable se-
cret key rate. We expect in particular that the H2()
term representing the error correction should remain un-
changed — since a properly implemented SCA will not
induce additional errors. However, Alice and Bob will
have to do additional privacy-amplification, so this term
will be modified.
The key rate for BB84 in the presence of an SCA was
found by [23, 31, 32]. They show that the effect of the
SCA may be summarised by a quantity known as the
distinguishability, ∆. This is used to modify the error
rate, , in the privacy-amplification term to become an
effective error rate, ˜ given by
˜(,∆) = + 4∆(1−∆)(1− 2)
+ 4(1− 2∆)
√
∆(1−∆)(1− ). (8)
This means that we do not have to know exactly what
Eve does with the states and the information available
to her. For example, she may perform a THA to try to
learn θ directly. Or, she might tailor her THA such that
the measurement on the returned state only reveals in-
formation about the basis that Alice has chosen. After
estimating this basis, she might then measure the flying
qubit in that basis to learn θ without disturbing the state.
She might do some combination of these approaches, or
something else entirely. As such, it is of foundational
importance to our analysis that we have some way of
5quantifying the strength of a THA, that only makes ref-
erence to the state she sends out, not to what she does
to the state she gets back, including any measurement
or series of measurements on any combination of the re-
turned state and flying qubits. The distinguishability
varies from 0 when all choices of θ are indistinguishable
from the point-of-view of Eve, and 12 when she can dis-
tinguish all settings with certainty. In practice, a value of
∆ much greater than 0 will result in a secret key rate of
0, since it would require Alice and Bob to be sacrificing
raw key bits for error correction and privacy amplifica-
tion at a rate faster than they are being generated. This
formulation of the strength of a THA in terms of ∆ puts
a lower bound on the secret key rate that Alice and Bob
can hope to achieve. The distinguishability is given by
[33]
∆ ≤
1− F
(
ρ0η,µT , ρ
pi/2
η,µT
)
2
, (9)
where F (ρ1, ρ2) = Tr
[√√
ρ1ρ2
√
ρ1
]
is the quantum fi-
delity function. Note that this is different from the form
given in [19]. There, they reduce Eq. 9 to a form involv-
ing the optimal purifications of the two output states.
Since they are using pure coherent states, such optimal
purifications are easily found. However, there exists no
general prescriptive formula to find these for a pair of
general mixed states, so we must use the fidelity form of
the distinguishability.
One may note that in this form, ∆ has a nice physically
intuitive interpretation. Suppose two states are prepared,
one from theX basis and one from the Y basis, and one of
them is given to Eve. She is aware of which two states are
prepared but not which one she received. The quantity
∆ then corresponds to the minimum probability that she
makes an error in distinguishing them. If she succeeds in
this task, she will know θ, without needing to perform any
additional operations on the flying qubits. This leads to
the non-trivial conclusion that Eve’s optimal THA may
be performed by only interacting with her own returned
state, and she does not gain anything by interacting with
Bob’s qubits.
The rest of this section is dedicated to calculating an
exact expression for ∆ for the set of thermalised Gaus-
sian states described above, and section IV is focused on
calculating a bound on ∆ for the set of general separable
states. It should be noted that, unlike , ˜ (or equiva-
lently ∆) cannot be directly measured in the process of
running the QKD protocol. Therefore Alice should be
able to perform some local action to be able to deter-
mine ∆ to some high precision, and then use this value
to determine how much privacy amplification they should
perform.
The problem of calculating the fidelity between two
multimode Gaussian states was solved by [34]. There,
they show that, for any Gaussian states ρ1, ρ2, we have:
F (ρ1, ρ2) = F
(
V˜1, V˜2
)
e−
1
4 (u1−u2)
T
(V˜1+V˜2)
−1
(u1−u2)
F
(
V˜1, V˜2
)
=
∏n
k=1
√
wk +
√
w2k − 1
4
√
det
(
V˜1 + V˜2
) ,
(10)
where V˜ is equivalent to V , but expressed in the basis
[xˆ1, xˆ2, . . . , xˆn, pˆ1, pˆ2, . . . , pˆn]
T
and wk are the eigenvalues
of the auxiliary matrix W , defined as
W = −2iΩT
(
V˜1 + V˜2
)−1(Ω
4
+ V˜2ΩV˜1
)
Ω,
Ω =
[
0 1
−1 0
]
⊗ 1n.
(11)
When we combine the fidelity given in Eq. 10 with
the mean vectors and covariance matrices given in Eq. 6,
we find that the fidelity between two of Eve’s returned
states is given by
F
(
ρ0η,µT , ρ
pi/2
η,µT
)
=
1
4B
e−2µDω/B
(√
C + |4µTω + 4η(1 + µT )− 1|
)
,
(12)
where
B = 2µTω + (1 + µT )(ω
2 + 1)η,
C = 16η2(1 + µT )
2 + 8η(1 + µT )ω(4µT + ω)
+ (1 + 4µTω)
2.
(13)
Eve wants to choose her parameters ξE and µD in or-
der to minimise the fidelity (and so maximise the dis-
tinguishability) between her returned states. Whilst in-
creasing either of these parameters decreases F , she is
not necessarily free to do both simultaneously. Both
squeezing and displacement increase the average number
of photons in each mode, and we have already established
in subsection III A that this is limited by some number
N .
Suppose, then, that Eve decides to use pN of her
available photons to contribute towards squeezing and
(1 − p)N towards displacement. Since a squeezing pa-
rameter of ξE gives an average photon number per
mode of sinh2(ξE), and a displacement parameter of
α contributes |α|2 photons, we find that we can do
no better that setting the parameters such that ω =
cosh
[
arcsinh
(
2
√
pN
)]
, µD = (1− p)Nη for some p.
When we insert these values into Eq. 12, we can inves-
tigate the behaviour as a function of p and η for various
values of N and µT . We find that F is minimised when
p = 0. This means that Eve is best served by using all
6of her photons to contribute to the displacement of her
state. As such, we can now simplify the fidelity, which
may be written as
F
(
ρ0η,µT , ρ
pi/2
η,µT
)
= exp
(
− µD
1 + 2µT
)
. (14)
This means that Eve’s optimal Gaussian-state attack is
one involving coherent states only. This provides a rigor-
ous footing for earlier works which analyse the results of
coherent-state attacks with an attenuating defense [19].
C. Effect of thermal noise on Bob
We can see from Eq. 14 that Eve’s knowledge of θ is
minimised when µT becomes very large. However, when
Alice sends a lot of thermal photons into the system,
some of these photons are also picked up by Bob. If Bob
measures these instead of the signal photons he is likely
to pick up a bit error. Clearly when µT → ∞ Alice
and Bob will not be able to securely communicate, so
we need to find an optimal level of µT that clouds Eve’s
estimation of the state without affecting Bob too much.
In this section we analyse and quantify this.
Consider the case where Alice and Bob are sending and
receiving in the same basis. By implementing asymmetric
BB84 [35], this can be the case for almost all qubits. We
now say that at the end of the optical channel between
Alice and Bob there is a polarising beam splitter which
sends the incoming photons into one of two detectors
which we label the correct and wrong detectors. These
represent Bob measuring the bit that Alice did and did
not send respectively.
Alice and Bob will try to distill a secret key from the
key bits where Bob believes he detected only a single
photon (which he must assume to be the signal photon).
The probability for this to occur for a given signal qubit
we will call psucc. Here we will assume that Bob uses
bucket detectors. That is to say they have two measure-
ment outcomes: either no photons were detected, or one
or more photons were detected. We show in Appendix
A that, perhaps counter-intuitively, this actually gives a
better secret key rate than using number-resolving detec-
tors, in agreement with previous results [29].
Let pX, p× be the probabilities that the signal photon
was detected in the correct and wrong detector respec-
tively, and p• be the probability that the signal is not
detected at all. Let q(c, w) be the probability that c
noise photons are detected in the correct detector and w
in the wrong detector. Bob will register a “valid” qubit
if exactly one of the detectors clicks. We can then say
that
psucc = pX
∞∑
c=0
q(c, 0) + p×
∞∑
w=0
q(0, w)
+ p•
∞∑
c=1
q(c, 0) + p•
∞∑
w=1
q(0, w).
(15)
We can identify the bit error rate, , as the probability
that a photon gives a click in the wrong detector, and is
therefore equal to
 =
p×
∑∞
w=0 q(0, w) + p•
∑∞
w=1 q(0, w)
psucc
. (16)
To calculate these quantities, we identify the following:
pX = T (1−Q),
p× = TQ
p• = (1− T )
q(i, j) =
µ˜T
i
(µ˜T + 1)i+1
µ˜T
j
(µ˜T + 1)j+1
∞∑
c=0
q(c, 0) =
∞∑
w=0
q(0, w) =
1
µ˜T + 1
∞∑
c=1
q(c, 0) =
∞∑
w=1
q(0, w) =
µT
(µ˜T + 1)2
.
(17)
Here, Q is the probability for Bob to register a bit-flip
error in the absence of thermal noise, T is the trans-
missivity of the channel including the efficiency of Bob’s
detectors, and µ˜T = TµT /2 is the average number of
thermal photons arriving at each detector. In practice,
µ˜T may be lower than this, since Eve will have inadver-
tently intercepted some of them. However, we give here
the worst-case scenario. We can then say that
psucc =
2T (2 + 2µT − TµT )
(2 + TµT )2
,
 =
2Q+ µT (1− T +QT )
2 + µT (2− T ) .
(18)
In order to find an expression for T we assume that the
photons face an exponential drop-off with distance, and
set T = e−L/L0 where L0 is the attenuation length. To
model Q, we may assume that, as is usual for QKD pro-
tocols, Alice and Bob are equipped with quantum memo-
ries, and the flying qubits are used as a process by which
they establish entanglement between these memories [36–
39]. This is necessary for all but the most primitive pro-
tocols, since some storing of entangled qubits is required
in order to perform entanglement distillation and privacy
amplification algorithms such as DJEMPS [40], which are
needed in order to prove that Eve has not entangled Bob’s
7FIG. 3: Minimum achievable secret key rate under the
presence of a coherent state attack (the most powerful
Gaussian-state attack), with a thermal noise defense
involving µT photons being added by Alice to cloud
Eve’s attack signal. Top graph shows the key rate for
different values of quantum memory time, τ . Dashed
lines show the key rate with no thermal noise added,
and solid lines are key rates maximised over µT . From
left to right for both dashed and solid lines, we have
τ = 2, 5, 10µs respectively. Lower graph shows the
optimal values of µT at each distance. In all plots
µD = 0.1 and L0 = 25 km.
state with an ancilla. As such, we set Q = 12
[
1− eLc/τ ],
where τ is the lifetime of the memory (typically on the
order of microseconds). Finally, when psucc < 1, we must
replace ∆ with ∆/psucc, since the lost signals may have
been selectively eliminated by Eve to improve her mutual
information with the key (Ref. [23], Eq. 32).
D. Results
By combining these elements, which measure the ef-
fects of the thermal noise on Eve and on Bob, as well as
the result that coherent states are optimal, we find that
the final secret key rate for a general multi-mode Gaus-
sian state attack in the presence of an attenuating filter
and a thermal noise defense may given by
K = psucc [1−H2 ()−H2 (˜ (,∆′))] , (19)
where ∆′ =
[
1− exp
(
− µD1+2µT
)]
/ (2psucc).
Eq. 19 is highly dependent on µT . We optimise K over
µT to find a true measure of the utility of the thermal
noise defense. We consider the case where µD = 0.1 and
L0 = 25km. The ability of the thermal noise defense to
protect the secret key rate is shown in Fig. 3.
We can see from this that employing a thermal noise
defense has the capacity to more than double the effective
range of a QKD system. However, when the key rates get
very small, very high temperatures are required in order
to retain any security. This is because the mechanism by
which increasing µT decreases the key rate is by decreas-
ing the pre-factor psucc, which may go arbitrarily low,
but never reach 0. On the other hand, there is a small
critical effective error-rate not equal to 1 that Eve can
induce that will result in the key rate dropping to zero.
Therefore, when Alice calculates that the effective error
that could result from Eve launching a THA is above
the critical value, Alice is forced to increase the thermal
noise to very high values to bring the effective error down
again. This mechanism of sacrificing raw key rate is com-
mon amongst QKD protocols, and is the general basis for
privacy amplification [40, 41].
One may notice that the ranges shown in Fig. 3 are
well below those shown in many other QKD proposals.
One reason for this is that other proposals in general do
not consider the effects of THAs, or SCAs in general, and
the key-rate boon provided by the thermal noise defense
cannot exceed the calculated key rate of a system that
does not recognise SCAs in the first place. Secondarily,
the key-rate plots shown here are intended to show the
relative advantage of adding thermal noise to the system.
They are not intended to show the state-of-the-art ranges
that might be achieved by more advanced QKD proto-
cols, which may take advantage of technologies such as
quantum repeaters [39, 42–44], long-lived quantum mem-
ories [37, 45] or post-selective entanglement generation
[39, 46].
IV. GENERAL SEPARABLE ATTACKS
We have shown that, amongst multi-mode Gaussian
attack states that Eve might use, the separable coherent
state is optimal. Whilst it may seem initially surprising
that entanglement does not assist her, note that entangle-
ment between any two modes will drop off as more of the
signal is attenuated. We are left with a distinguishability
that depends only on the average output photon number,
µD, so ∆ does not explicitly depend on the transmissivity
η.
It may be argued that coherent states are likely to be
optimal amongst the separable states, since under loss,
photon-counting statistics will tend to be Poissonian [47].
Therefore the best one can hope to do is with a Poisso-
nian state that retains coherence, i.e. a coherent state.
However, a state that is initially highly non-Poissonian
in its statistics may require a very high attenuation be-
fore it approximates a Poissonian distribution, and there
is no guarantee that the expression for ∆ derived from
coherent states will still hold.
In this section, we consider the set-up where Alice de-
fends against a THA by use of an attenuator but uses
no thermal defense, and that Eve attacks the system us-
8ing any separable state, but gets back a state with only
a few photons. Whilst this seems to be a special case
for Eve, note that it is more general that the situation
considered in section III since this approach considers a
set of states which includes, yet is larger than, the set
of coherent states that are optimal within the Gaussian
states.
Here, we will consider Eve’s input state in its density
matrix form instead of its covariance matrix form. We
will consider the effect of the attenuator on ρ as a quan-
tum channel, which we express in Kraus operator form:
E (ρ) =
∞∑
k=0
Ek (ρ) ≡
∞∑
k=0
AˆkρAˆ
†
k
Aˆk =
∞∑
j=k
√(
j
k
)√
η
j−k√
1− η k |j − k〉〈j| .
(20)
Each term AˆkρAˆ
†
k represents k photons being lost from
the state ρ, each with independent probability η.
We express each term in the map as follows
Ek (ρ) =
∞∑
i,j=k
Bi,j,k(η) 〈i| ρ |j〉 · |i− k〉〈j − k|
Bi,j,k(η) =
√(
i
k
)(
j
k
)
η
i+j
2 −k(1− η)k.
(21)
Since we require a very high level of attenuation to
achieve any kind of useful secrecy, we may assume that
η is very close to 0. Therefore we may expand the factor
Bi,j,k(η) as
Bi,j,k(η) ≈ Bi,j,k(0) + dB
dη
∣∣∣
0
η +
1
2
d2B
dη2
∣∣∣
0
η2, (22)
leading to an expansion of each term in the map as
Ek ≈ E(0)k + E(1)k + E(2)k . (23)
Using the fact that limx→0 xp = δp,0 for p ≥ 0, we can
see that Bi,j,k(0) =
√(
i
k
)(
j
k
)
δ i+j
2 ,k
. Performing the sums
over i, j, k we get E(0) = |0〉〈0|∑∞k=0 〈k| ρ |k〉 = |0〉〈0|
(where we have used the fact that Tr [ρ] = 1)
In the same way, we find that
E(1)k =
∞∑
i,j=k
√(
i
k
)(
j
k
)[(
i+ j
2
− k
)
δ i+j
2 ,k+1
δi,kδj,k+2+δi,k+2δj,k+δi,k+1δj,k+1
−kδ i+j
2 ,k
]
η
∴ E(1) = −µ |0〉〈0|+
µ |1〉〈1|+
∞∑
k=0
√(
(k + 2)
k
)
|0〉〈2| 〈k| ρ |k + 2〉+
∞∑
k=0
√(
(k + 2)
k
)
|2〉〈0| 〈k + 2| ρ |k〉 ,
(24)
where µ = η
∑∞
k=0 k 〈k| ρ |k〉 is the average number of
photons that Eve receives back after attenuation.
Similarly,
E(2) =η
2
2
(
v + 〈nˆ〉2ρ + 〈nˆ〉ρ
)
|0〉〈0| −
η2
(
v + 〈nˆ〉2ρ + 〈nˆ〉ρ
)
|1〉〈1|+
η2
2
(
v + 〈nˆ〉2ρ + 〈nˆ〉ρ
)
|2〉〈2|+
off-diagonals on |0〉〈2| and |2〉〈0|+
terms on |i〉〈j| where i or j ≥ 3.
(25)
where v = 〈nˆ2〉ρ−〈nˆ〉ρ is the variance in the initial state.
Whilst the diagonal terms can be expressed in terms of
the macroscopic observables of ρ, the off-diagonal terms
have no such simple expression.
Firstly we should bound the effects of higher-order
terms. We do this by supposing that Eve performs a
measurement on her returned state to determine whether
or not the state contains 2 or fewer photons. That
is to say, her measurement of ρ has 2 outcomes corre-
sponding to operators EˆX = |0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1| + |2〉〈2| and
Eˆ× =
∑∞
k=3 |k〉〈k|.
In order to ensure that this measurement does not re-
duce the information that Eve learns about the state, we
say that if she gets the result corresponding to Eˆ× then
we assume that she learns the key bit θ perfectly. That
is to say, instead of receiving E (ρ) she can be said to
receive some state |θ〉〈θ|, where 〈θ1|θ2〉 = δθ1,θ2 .
If the measurement is successful, then Eve’s state is
projected onto the two-or-fewer-photon subspace, giving
ρsub = EˆXE(ρ)EˆX/Tr
[
EˆXE(ρ)
]
. In the case where θ =
0, this may be expressed in the basis of {|0〉 , |1〉 , |2〉} by
ρθ=0sub =

1− µ+ η22 α 0 β
0 µ− η2α 0
β 0 η
2
2 α
 , (26)
9where α = v + 〈nˆ〉2ρ + 〈nˆ〉ρ and β is some coefficient that
cannot be easily expressed in terms of macroscopic prop-
erties of the state. In the case where θ = pi/2 we simply
pick up a factor of −1 on the coefficient β. The overall
state Eve gets back is then
ρθreturned = Tr
[
EˆXE(ρ)
]
ρθsub + Tr
[
Eˆ×E(ρ)
]
|θ〉〈θ| . (27)
In order to bound the contribution of the second term,
we show in Appendix B that
Tr
[
EˆXE(ρ)
]
≥ e−µ, (28)
and so Tr
[
Eˆ×E(ρ)
]
≤ 1− e−µ.
Since we want to find an upper limit to the informa-
tion that Eve can learn, we say that she can receive any
state that is consistent with both Eq. 26 and the laws of
physics. We find that the fidelity between two such den-
sity matrices is minimised when the variance v is chosen
such that the |1〉〈1| component is 0 and the off-diagonal
terms are maximised. Because of this, it turns out that
we do not need to be able to express β in a way relating
to macroscopic properties such as average photon num-
ber and variance. We simply choose β to be the largest
value such that ρθsub remains positive semi-definite, which
is β = 12
√
µ(2− µ).
This, along with Eq. 27 and Eq. 9 gives an ultimate
distinguishability bound for the separable attack-state
case of
∆ ≤ 1− e
−µ√1− 3µ(2− µ)/4
2
. (29)
Importantly, this is a function of a single variable, that
is measurable by Alice; the average output photon num-
ber. By bounding quantities of Eve’s state that cannot
be measured, we have ensured that Alice can make an
accurate assessment of how secure her QKD system is,
whilst not knowing anything about the microscopic de-
tails of Eve’s state.
Fig. 4 shows that the value of ∆ is higher for our
separable bound than for the case of a coherent state,
whether one diluted by thermal noise or not. We also
show it to be higher than the bound on ∆ for a noiseless
coherent-state attack found by Lucamarini et al. of ∆ =
[1−eµ cos(µ)]/2. Whilst our bound on ∆ is not absolutely
tight (since the 3-photon contributions surely will not
convey perfect information of θ), we can see that is not
too generous, since it tracks the known achievable bounds
quite closely.
V. SHUTTER DEFENSE
In both sections III and IV, it was necessary that Alice
use a strong one-way attenuator. This must be able to
FIG. 4: Upper bounds on the distinguishability, with
average returned photon number µ. Dotted lines show
the distinguishability for a coherent-state attack with a
thermal noise defense, of thermal photon number µT .
Upper dotted line (blue) shows µT = 1, lower dotted
line (green) shows µT = 5. The black dashed line is the
distinguishability for coherent-state attacks found by
Lucamarini et. al. Solid line is the bound for separable
states, which as expected is always greater that the
other bounds.
let almost all of the light through in a forward direction,
whilst blocking all but perhaps a single photon going in
the reverse. Whilst such devices certainly exist [48, 49],
achieving such a high level of attenuation can be a great
technical challenge. We should ask if there is any other
device we can insert into the optical channel that will
result in a large effective attenuation factor.
We show here that this is possible by considering the
effect of replacing the attenuator with a shutter, such as
an electro-optic modulator or a chopper. This runs con-
trary to the claim of [50] Sec. VI K, where it is claimed
that a shutter cannot defend against a THA (although
they consider only a shutter directly adjacent to the ap-
paratus, thus setting to travel time for the light to zero).
This lets light through for a short duration of tS , at a pe-
riod of tP . Once Eve’s pulse passes the shutter, it must
travel the remaining distance to the apparatus that en-
codes θ, reflect off it, and return to the shutter. If the
shutter is closed when the pulse arrives, it will reflect off
the rear-side of the shutter with some co-efficient of re-
flectivity ηR, return to the apparatus, and then reflect
again. This will continue until the pulse of light arrives
back at the shutter whilst it is open, and it will then
pass through and be detected by Eve. Note that whilst
the pulse will pick up an additional phase factor of θ on
each reflection, we will hold by the principle of assuming
that Eve’s computational and measurement power is the
maximal allowed by the laws of physics. As such, it is
plausible that she will be able to know by the time taken
for the pulse to return exactly how many times the light
reflected off the apparatus, and so calculate an estimate
for the actual value of θ from her measured value.
Let tL be the time period that a pulse of light takes to
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FIG. 5: Top: The number of reflections a pulse of light
will make, as a function of the light travel time between
the shutter and the apparatus. Middle: The resulting
secret key rate. Here, we have used ηR = 0.5, meaning
half of the light is lost upon each reflection. Bottom:
The minimum secret key rate that can be guaranteed if
there is a 1% margin of error in the knowledge of the
light travel time, found using a minimising convolution
functional.
make the return journey from the shutter to the encoding
apparatus and back. If the light makesR return journeys,
then it will have reflected off the rear-side of the shutter
R− 1 times. One may see that R can be found to be the
smallest integer such that
0 ≤ (R× tL mod tP ) ≤ tS . (30)
Note that if the light travel time is known to arbitrary
precision and tS can be made arbitrarily short, then R
can be made arbitrarily high, by letting tL = tP − δ for
some arbitrarily small δ. This, however, is physically un-
realistic. We should instead model the shutter as being
open for some finite fraction of the light travel time. Sup-
pose initially that the shutter is open for a tenth of the
period, i.e. tS = tP /10. We may say that the light travel
time may be varied by implementing various lengths of
coiled optical fibre between the shutter and the appara-
tus.
The upper part of Fig. 5 shows the values of R that
result from varying light travel times, where the light
travel time is measured in units of tP . In the middle
part of Fig. 5 we convert this value of R into a secret
key rate. We do this by using Eq. 19 to find K (with
psucc = 1) and use the separable bound Eq. 29 for ∆. We
may say that the average output photon number is given
by µ = N ηR−1R , where N is the input photon number.
The lower part of Fig. 5 is the achievable key rate after
the application of what we call a minimising convolution.
This is a functional which takes a function f(·), and maps
each point x to the minimum of {f(x+ x′) | x′∈ [−δ, δ]}
for some convolution width δ. This is necessary because
there may be some experimental uncertainty in the light
travel time. So, for example, whilst a value of tL in-
finitesimally close to, but less than tP may seem to give
the highest value of R, and so the highest key rate, if
tL was even slightly underestimated, this would result in
a value of R = 1 and so a far lower security would be
achieved. For Fig. 5 we have used δ = 0.01. This means
that if we have a 95% confidence interval of knowing the
light travel time to within 1%, then we can have a confi-
dence of 95% of being able to achieve the key rate shown
in the lower graph.
Note that if we fix the light travel time appropriately
(to approximately about 0.9 × tP ) then we can achieve
a secret key rate of almost unity from a co-efficient of
reflectivity of ηR = 0.5. One thing that one should bear
in mind is that this is strongly dependent on the width of
the confidence interval on tL. Since we take the minimum
of the interval, it is clear that if the interval is too wide,
then no secret key rate will be able to be guaranteed.
If one wishes to halve the width of the relative con-
fidence interval, this can be done by doubling both the
light travel time and the shutter period. However, this
will result in a longer time between raw key bit attempts,
which will have a lowering effect on the key rate. Simi-
larly, if one tries to increase the key rate whilst using a
shutter defense, one should be mindful of the effect it has
on the minimum achievable key rate. For example, if the
raw key rate was doubled, the uncertainty in tL could
increase from 1% to 2%. We find that this results in a
maximum key rate after the application of a minimising
convolution of around 0.75, and so increasing the overall
secret key rate to 2 × 0.75 = 1.5 of the original value.
Similar to the case with adding thermal noise, in any ex-
perimental realisation one will have to adjust the light
travel time to find the right balance between increasing
raw key rate and increasing secrecy. In any case, this
brief analysis shows that the use of a shutter as a defense
against the THA is one worthy of consideration, and may
provide effective attenuations comparable to those of di-
rectional attenuators. The choice as to which to use in
any given implementation will depend on the details of
the experimental set-up.
VI. CONCLUSION
The discovery and implementation of the Trojan Horse
Attack once threatened to eliminate the security so fa-
mously promised by quantum key distribution. Early
seminal works have shown that the situation is not hope-
less, and have indicated ways to quantify and abate this
threat.
In this work we have fully characterised and quantified
the effect of the THA on the key rate under two gen-
eral attack vectors. We have shown that if Eve uses a
multimode Gaussian attack state, her best bet is to use
a coherent state. We have also quantified the maximum
damage on the secrecy that could be caused by Eve using
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any separable state. We hope that this may be extended
to the general entangled case in the future, but we have
provided heuristic arguments for why we do not expect
much of an improvement for Eve by doing this.
We have described two novel ways of counteracting the
THA; a passive defense, enabled by adding thermal noise
into the system, and an active defense with an optical
modulator. These complement the attenuation-based de-
fense discussed in earlier work.
This all shows that side-channel attacks cannot be con-
sidered only as an afterthought in QKD systems. Even a
relatively rudimentary SCA can, if not protected against,
hugely reduce the security of a protocol. If we try to
improve the security by privacy amplification alone we
find that the secret key rate soon drops to zero. This
highlights the importance of proper and specific defenses
against SCAs that are easily quantified in terms of ex-
perimentally accessible quantities.
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Appendix A: Use of number-resolving detectors
Our calculation of the secret-key rate is based on the
fact that Bob uses bucket detectors. One might nat-
urally ask whether using more state-of-the-art technol-
ogy such as photon-number-resolving detectors (PNRDs)
would improve the situation for Bob.
When this is the case, Eq. 15 becomes
psucc = pX q(0, 0) + p× q(0, 0)
+ p• q(1, 0) + p• q(0, 1),
= T
1
(µ˜T + 1)2
+ 2 (1− T ) 1
µ˜T + 1
µ˜T
(µ˜T + 1)2
,
(A1)
since a click is only registered when exactly one photon
enters a detector.
When we calculate  by taking the sum of the contri-
butions to psucc that cause the wrong detector to click
conditioned on the probability of getting a click in the
first place, we find that  is actually the same whether
we use PNRDs or bucket detectors! This interesting con-
gruence is a result of the fact that the noise obeys thermal
statistics, and will not generally be true for other noise
distributions. However, whilst the relative error is not
affected, psucc is actually lower in the case of PNRDs!
This means that the secret key rate can not be improved
by using PNRDs, and is in fact worsened in almost all
cases. This is because the restriction to PNRDs means
that Bob is more likely to reject legitimate signals than
noise photons.
Appendix B: Proof of Eq. 28
We want to show that Tr
[
EˆXE(ρ)
]
≥ e−µ.
First note that since EˆX = |0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1| + |2〉〈2|, we
can assert that
Tr
[
EˆXE(ρ)
]
≥ Tr [|0〉〈0| E(ρ)] . (B1)
Since E does not map off-diagonal elements to diago-
nals and |0〉〈0| is diagonal, we can consider only the effect
of E on diagonal elements, and say that
Tr [|0〉〈0| E(ρ)] = Tr
[
|0〉〈0| E
( ∞∑
k=0
pk,k |k〉〈k|
)]
=
∞∑
k=0
pk,k Tr [|0〉〈0| E(|k〉〈k|)] ,
(B2)
where here pk,k is the k-th diagonal element of ρ.
We want our ultimate bounds to be in terms of the
average photon number of the states. To relate the above
quantity to this, we claim that
∞∑
k=0
pk,k Tr [|0〉〈0| E(|k〉〈k|)] ≥ Tr [|0〉〈0| E (|〈nˆ〉ρ〉〈〈nˆ〉ρ|)] .
(B3)
That is to say, the average of the probabilities of losing
each of many different photon number states is greater
than the probability of losing one state of the average
photon number (which we assume without loss of gener-
ality to be an integer).
Since a state is mapped to |0〉〈0| if and only if it loses
all of its photons, we can say that
Tr [|0〉〈0| E(|k〉〈k|)] = (1− η)k , (B4)
We will consider first the case of ρ being a mixture of
only two Fock states, with weightings p and 1 − p and
respective photon numbers n and m. By using Eq. B4,
Eq. B3 then becomes
p(1− η)n + (1− p)(1− η)m ≥ (1− η)pn+(1−p)m. (B5)
If we let n = m+ δ, then this simplifies to
− yp + py − p+ 1 ≥ 0, (B6)
where we have used y ≡ (1−η)δ. The claim then reduces
to proving that this polynomial is satisfied for all y, p ∈
[0, 1].
Let f(p) = −yp+py−p+1. We have f(0) = f(1) = 0.
This function has a unique stationary point between 0
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and 1, and the curvature = − [log(y)]2 yp is everywhere
negative. Therefore f(p) ≥ 0. This proves the claim
for a bimodal initial state. The general claim follows by
induction.
We now have that
Tr
[
EˆXE(ρ)
]
≥ (1− η)〈nˆ〉ρ =
(
1− µ〈nˆ〉ρ
)〈nˆ〉ρ
. (B7)
Since the average number of input photon number is
generally of the scale of dozens of orders of magnitude
above unity, we may confidently take the limit of 〈nˆ〉ρ →∞, which reduces Eq. B7 to Eq. 28.
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